Specify a webhook-driven task for OpenClaw
Describe event inputs, validation, deduplication, and intended actions before integration work.
PTES-aligned adversarial security audit for backend, frontend, and mobile applications. Produces a CVSS-scored Hacker Report with verified PoCs and phased remediation.
---
name: pentest
description: "PTES-aligned adversarial security audit for backend, frontend, and mobile applications. Produces a CVSS-scored Hacker Report with verified PoCs and phased remediation."
metadata:
internal: true
triggers:
keywords:
- pentest
- workflow
---
# Pentest Skill
> [!IMPORTANT]
> PTES-aligned adversarial security audit for backend, frontend, and mobile applications. Produces a CVSS-scored Hacker Report with verified PoCs and phased remediation.
Optional args: slug=<feature>, ticket=<id/url>, mode=interactive|autonomous|channel, channel=<id>, auto_continue=true|false, profile=business|hybrid|technical.
## Instructions
When the user asks to perform this workflow, execute the following steps:
# 🕵️♂️ Penetration Test (PTES-Aligned)
Goal: Execute a red-team assessment across backend, frontend, and mobile targets with verified PoCs and audit-grade evidence.
## Steps
1. Scope and authorization:
- Determine mode (`whitebox`, `greybox`, `blackbox`) and targets.
- Verify explicit, current authorization, target exclusions, permitted techniques, time window and stop contact. Require demonstrated runtime controls for live actions; unsupported controls block execution, not offline planning.
2. Intel and threat model:
- Identify stack, endpoints, parameters, local storage, schemes, and secrets.
- Use `common-security-audit`, `common-dast-tooling`, and architecture docs when available.
- Map trust boundaries, secrets, external integrations, and privileged workflows before exploit attempts.
3. Vulnerability analysis:
- Run scans and delegate: SAST/SCA to `specialist-aspm-correlator`, dynamic/logic to `specialist-logic-hacker`, binary/mobile to `specialist-mobile-reverser`.
- Rank targets by `exposure × sensitivity × auth_coverage`.
4. Exploit verification:
- Confirm findings only with reproducible evidence within scope; never force unsafe exploitation.
- Optional lab handoff: When verifying an exploit hypothesis against an isolated synthetic lab target, hand off to `cyber-lab-validation` with action-specific authorization and verified host isolation controls.
- Prohibitions: Never target production/public assets, use real credentials, or exfiltrate real data.
- If active verification is blocked, refused, or unsupported, record step `blocked` or finding `not-tested`; continue independent threat modeling, code review, and remediation guidance without retrying with disguised prompts.
- Preserve `suspected`, `blocked`, `not-tested` and `false-positive` dispositions separately from `confirmed`; record missing evidence, preconditions and blast radius.
- Use synthetic identities/data; no real sensitive-data extraction. Stop on scope drift or impact; obtain approval before restarting.
5. Reporting:
- Write `artifacts/security-review.md` with assumptions, source provenance, review context, runtime contract, PoCs, blast radius, finding confidence, exploit path, evidence gaps, and handoff notes.
- Emit `artifacts/security-review.dev.md`, `artifacts/security-review.appsec.md`, or `artifacts/security-review.exec.md` only when leadership, client, or AppSec reporting is in scope.
- Score from 100: Critical -25 (cap 25), High -15 (cap 40), Medium -8, Low -3.
- Reuse the existing `security-review.md` record when pentest follows earlier design or PR security review work.
- Deliver findings in the standard template below.
## Output Template
### Executive Summary
- **Hacker Score**: X/100 ([Critical/Vulnerable/Moderate/Hardened])
- **Target Scope**: [repos, URLs, mobile apps]
- **Findings**: [Critical/High/Medium/Low counts]
### Findings Table
| ID | Title | Platform | Severity | CVSS | CWE | PoC |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| SEC-01 | [title] | [backend\|frontend\|mobile] | [Critical\|High\|Medium\|Low] | [score] | [CWE-id] | [Yes\|No] |
---
name: pentest
description: "PTES-aligned adversarial security audit for backend, frontend, and mobile applications. Produces a CVSS-scored Hacker Report with verified PoCs and phased remediation."
metadata:
internal: true
triggers:
keywords:
- pentest
- workflow
---
# Pentest Skill
> [!IMPORTANT]
> PTES-aligned adversarial security audit for backend, frontend, and mobile applications. Produces a CVSS-scored Hacker Report with verified PoCs and phased remediation.
Optional args: slug=<feature>, ticket=<id/url>, mode=interactive|autonomous|channel, channel=<id>, auto_continue=true|false, profile=business|hybrid|technical.
## Instructions
When the user asks to perform this workflow, execute the following steps:
# 🕵️♂️ Penetration Test (PTES-Aligned)
Goal: Execute a red-team assessment across backend, frontend, and mobile targets with verified PoCs and audit-grade evidence.
## Steps
1. Scope and authorization:
- Determine mode (`whitebox`, `greybox`, `blackbox`) and targets.
- Verify explicit, current authorization, target exclusions, permitted techniques, time window and stop contact. Require demonstrated runtime controls for live actions; unsupported controls block execution, not offline planning.
2. Intel and threat model:
- Identify stack, endpoints, parameters, local storage, schemes, and secrets.
- Use `common-security-audit`, `common-dast-tooling`, and architecture docs when available.
- Map trust boundaries, secrets, external integrations, and privileged workflows before exploit attempts.
3. Vulnerability analysis:
- Run scans and delegate: SAST/SCA to `specialist-aspm-correlator`, dynamic/logic to `specialist-logic-hacker`, binary/mobile to `specialist-mobile-reverser`.
- Rank targets by `exposure × sensitivity × auth_coverage`.
4. Exploit verification:
- Confirm findings only with reproducible evidence within scope; never force unsafe exploitation.
- Optional lab handoff: When verifying an exploit hypothesis against an isolated synthetic lab target, hand off to `cyber-lab-validation` with action-specific authorization and verified host isolation controls.
- Prohibitions: Never target production/public assets, use real credentials, or exfiltrate real data.
- If active verification is blocked, refused, or unsupported, record step `blocked` or finding `not-tested`; continue independent threat modeling, code review, and remediation guidance without retrying with disguised prompts.
- Preserve `suspected`, `blocked`, `not-tested` and `false-positive` dispositions separately from `confirmed`; record missing evidence, preconditions and blast radius.
- Use synthetic identities/data; no real sensitive-data extraction. Stop on scope drift or impact; obtain approval before restarting.
5. Reporting:
- Write `artifacts/security-review.md` with assumptions, source provenance, review context, runtime contract, PoCs, blast radius, finding confidence, exploit path, evidence gaps, and handoff notes.
- Emit `artifacts/security-review.dev.md`, `artifacts/security-review.appsec.md`, or `artifacts/security-review.exec.md` only when leadership, client, or AppSec reporting is in scope.
- Score from 100: Critical -25 (cap 25), High -15 (cap 40), Medium -8, Low -3.
- Reuse the existing `security-review.md` record when pentest follows earlier design or PR security review work.
- Deliver findings in the standard template below.
## Output Template
### Executive Summary
- **Hacker Score**: X/100 ([Critical/Vulnerable/Moderate/Hardened])
- **Target Scope**: [repos, URLs, mobile apps]
- **Findings**: [Critical/High/Medium/Low counts]
### Findings Table
| ID | Title | Platform | Severity | CVSS | CWE | PoC |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| SEC-01 | [title] | [backend\|frontend\|mobile] | [Critical\|High\|Medium\|Low] | [score] | [CWE-id] | [Yes\|No] |
Imported from the listed AgentSkill.sh category. Complete supplied package files and notices are retained. Required external tools and credentials are not installed. No bundled code was executed during import. Individual agent task behavior has not been tested.