Specify a webhook-driven task for OpenClaw
Describe event inputs, validation, deduplication, and intended actions before integration work.
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---
name: consensus-permission-escalation-guard-488ac9a905a9
description: Pre-execution governance for IAM and permission escalation changes. Use when an agent or workflow proposes granting, expanding, or assuming higher privileges and you need deterministic ALLOW/BLOCK/REQUIRE_REWRITE decisions with strict schema validation, idempotency, and board-native audit artifacts.
version: 0.1.12
homepage: https://github.com/kaicianflone/consensus-permission-escalation-guard
source: https://github.com/kaicianflone/consensus-permission-escalation-guard
upstream:
consensus-guard-core: https://github.com/kaicianflone/consensus-guard-core
metadata:
openclaw:
requires:
bins:
- node
- tsx
env:
- CONSENSUS_STATE_FILE
- CONSENSUS_STATE_ROOT
install:
- kind: node
package: consensus-permission-escalation-guard
bins:
- node
- tsx
---
# consensus-permission-escalation-guard
`consensus-permission-escalation-guard` is the final safety gate before privilege elevation is applied.
## What this skill does
- validates escalation requests against a strict input schema (reject unknown fields)
- evaluates hard-block and rewrite policy flags for IAM risk patterns
- runs persona-weighted voting (or aggregates external votes)
- returns one of: `ALLOW | BLOCK | REQUIRE_REWRITE`
- writes decision artifacts for replay/audit
## Decision policy shape
Hard-block examples:
- wildcard permissions (`*`, `: *`, broad owner/admin jumps)
- missing ticket reference when required
- break-glass escalation without incident reference
- separation-of-duties conflicts (e.g., create + approve authority)
Rewrite examples:
- weak or non-actionable justification
- temporary duration exceeds policy limit
- production escalation requires explicit human confirmation gate
## Runtime and safety model
- runtime binaries: `node`, `tsx`
- network behavior: none in deterministic guard logic
- environment config read by this package: `CONSENSUS_STATE_FILE`, `CONSENSUS_STATE_ROOT`
- filesystem writes: consensus board/state artifacts under configured state path
## Invoke contract
- `invoke(input, opts?) -> Promise<OutputJson | ErrorJson>`
Modes:
- `mode="persona"` (default): uses local deterministic persona defaults for internal voting
- `mode="external_agent"`: consume `external_votes[]`, then aggregate and enforce policy deterministically
## Install
```bash
npm i consensus-permission-escalation-guard
```
## Quick start
```bash
node --import tsx run.js --input ./examples/input.json
```
## Tests
```bash
npm test
```
Test coverage includes schema rejection, hard-block paths, rewrite paths, allow paths, idempotent retries, and external-agent aggregation behavior.
Note: this skill depends on `consensus-guard-core` for aggregation/state helpers; review that package alongside this one for full runtime auditability.
See also: `SECURITY-ASSURANCE.md` for threat model, runtime boundaries, and deployment hardening guidance.
---
name: consensus-permission-escalation-guard-488ac9a905a9
description: Pre-execution governance for IAM and permission escalation changes. Use when an agent or workflow proposes granting, expanding, or assuming higher privileges and you need deterministic ALLOW/BLOCK/REQUIRE_REWRITE decisions with strict schema validation, idempotency, and board-native audit artifacts.
version: 0.1.12
homepage: https://github.com/kaicianflone/consensus-permission-escalation-guard
source: https://github.com/kaicianflone/consensus-permission-escalation-guard
upstream:
consensus-guard-core: https://github.com/kaicianflone/consensus-guard-core
metadata:
openclaw:
requires:
bins:
- node
- tsx
env:
- CONSENSUS_STATE_FILE
- CONSENSUS_STATE_ROOT
install:
- kind: node
package: consensus-permission-escalation-guard
bins:
- node
- tsx
---
# consensus-permission-escalation-guard
`consensus-permission-escalation-guard` is the final safety gate before privilege elevation is applied.
## What this skill does
- validates escalation requests against a strict input schema (reject unknown fields)
- evaluates hard-block and rewrite policy flags for IAM risk patterns
- runs persona-weighted voting (or aggregates external votes)
- returns one of: `ALLOW | BLOCK | REQUIRE_REWRITE`
- writes decision artifacts for replay/audit
## Decision policy shape
Hard-block examples:
- wildcard permissions (`*`, `: *`, broad owner/admin jumps)
- missing ticket reference when required
- break-glass escalation without incident reference
- separation-of-duties conflicts (e.g., create + approve authority)
Rewrite examples:
- weak or non-actionable justification
- temporary duration exceeds policy limit
- production escalation requires explicit human confirmation gate
## Runtime and safety model
- runtime binaries: `node`, `tsx`
- network behavior: none in deterministic guard logic
- environment config read by this package: `CONSENSUS_STATE_FILE`, `CONSENSUS_STATE_ROOT`
- filesystem writes: consensus board/state artifacts under configured state path
## Invoke contract
- `invoke(input, opts?) -> Promise<OutputJson | ErrorJson>`
Modes:
- `mode="persona"` (default): uses local deterministic persona defaults for internal voting
- `mode="external_agent"`: consume `external_votes[]`, then aggregate and enforce policy deterministically
## Install
```bash
npm i consensus-permission-escalation-guard
```
## Quick start
```bash
node --import tsx run.js --input ./examples/input.json
```
## Tests
```bash
npm test
```
Test coverage includes schema rejection, hard-block paths, rewrite paths, allow paths, idempotent retries, and external-agent aggregation behavior.
Note: this skill depends on `consensus-guard-core` for aggregation/state helpers; review that package alongside this one for full runtime auditability.
See also: `SECURITY-ASSURANCE.md` for threat model, runtime boundaries, and deployment hardening guidance.
Imported from the listed AgentSkill.sh category. Complete supplied package files and notices are retained. Includes source scripts; review them before use. Required external tools and credentials are not installed. No bundled code was executed during import. Individual agent task behavior has not been tested.